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JAMES W. NICKEL

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

Controversies about freedom of expression often occur along religious
and ethnic boundaries. The most familiar cases are ones where an
intolerant majority group attempts to silence the expressions or
protests of a minority. Less familiar, but also important, are cases
where an intolerant minority group seeks to squelch expressions or
protests of which it disapproves - e.g., the violent response of some
members of the Miami Cuban community in 1987 against a group
protesting U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras.
This paper connects issues about freedom of expression with more
general issues about tolerance of distinctive religious and cultural
groups. I argue that tolerance of expressions of distinctive religious and
cultural perspectives follows from, or is part of, the only policies for
dealing with cultural and religious diversity that are morally and
politically attractive in the United States today. I am concerned with

freedom of expression both as a constitutional right and as a more
general social policy.
This is a somewhat unusual way of treating the scope and justification of freedom of expression. Perhaps it will seem less peculiar if we
recall that liberalism, with its tolerant attitudes towards the expression
of different religious perspectives, is often thought to have evolved as a
practical response to the religious wars of early modern Europe. This
explanation of the origins of liberalism presupposes what I want to
emphasize, namely that tolerance is an attractive option in dealing
with the problems of accommodating diverse groups within a single
society.
' In 1965 Harry Kalven wrote that "it would not be a bad summary of the last three
decades of First Amendment issues in the [Supreme] Court to say simply Jehovah's
Witnesses, Communists, Negroes". The Negro and the First Amendment (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1965), pp. 135-6.
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This approach to the justification of freedom of expression is not

meant to disparage others. I think of my approach as a buttress to other
justifications of freedom of expression such as the need for a free

flow

of information if democracy is to work,2 the value of promoting
rational discussion of issues as a means to better founded beliefs and
policies,' and the requirements of a moral principle of autonomy.4 Perhaps the justification offered here can expand the scope of freedom of
expression into areas where it might otherwise not reach, prevent
exceptions that might otherwise be justifiable, and give weight in areas
where freedom of expression might, without this reinforcement, be
overridden by other considerations. The account I offer also helps
explain why the right to freedom of expression must be applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner.

Since I'll be emphasizing the problems posed by cultural diversity, I
should say in advance that I don't think that the United States is hopelessly diverse. It is pluralistic without being plural. It doesn't have the
severe problems of ethnic conflict found in countries such as India, the
Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia. Perhaps we can explain the degree of
unity in spite of diversity that exists in the U.S. by noting the following.
First, the United States is an immigrant society in which most people
have substantially assimilated to a dominant culture. It is unlike Canada or Sri Lanka, for example, where assimilation of immigrants to a
common national identity was impeded by previously existing cultural

boundaries. Second, the United States has long required universal education in English. This instills the national language in all children and
opens them to influences from the dominant culture. Third, the media
and entertainment industries are very influential in promoting English
and the mainstream culture. And fourth, knowing English and having
at least a veneer of mainstream culture is very useful economically.

2

See Alexander Meiklejohn, 'Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government', in

PoliticalFreedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
' See Frederick Schauer, FreeSpeech (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965).

a See Thomas Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1 (1972), 204-226.
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I. WAYS OF DEALING WITH DIVERSITY

There are three broad options for dealing with relations between
different religious or cultural groups within a single political unit To
reduce complexity here, I'll use a simple majority-minority model.
Suppose that we have a majority group and a minority group that are
sometimes in conflict, and that the majority group holds sufficient
political power to decide the fate of the minority. What are the main
options? 6
A. Get Rid of the Minority

This option is very unattractive morally, but it has been important
historically. Its worst form is simple genocide - killing the group the
majority wishes to be rid of. Another possible form is killing some
members of the minority in hopes of frightening the others into exile.
A third form is using threats of death and exile to force conversion or

rapid assimilation.
B. Partition:Put a PoliticalBoundary Between the Two Groups
This option has two forms. The first is externalpartition,which involves

creating a separate country for the minority. The partition of India into
Pakistan, India, and eventually Bangladesh illustrates this possibility.7 In
s These strategies may be accompanied by restrictions on immigration to prevent
diversity from increasing or re-emerging. But my focus here is on diversity that
already exists.
6 This matter can also be viewed from the perspective of a minority group. Its first
goal will be to avoid genocide and involuntary expulsion. Second, it will need to
decide whether external or internal partition is a viable and desirable option. Minorities often meet considerable resistance when they seek to secede. (Individuals may
decide this unilaterally by voluntary emigration, thus putting a boundary between
themselves and an oppressive group.) If no form of partition is an option, the goal will
be to find a form of co-existence that is more accommodating than the Triple S
system.

7 Partition seems to be permissible in many cases and sometimes a good thing. Consider the following view:

In retrospect, unbiased observers are likely to agree that the partition of India,
although not the manner in which it came about, has been a good thing. Even though
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some cases external partition is an option that minority groups are
eager to accept, and they may demand it by appealing to a right of self-

determination. The second form of this option is internal partition. It
involves creating a semi-autonomous region within the country for the
minority, normally using a territorial boundary for this purpose.

Illustrations of this are found in the national sub-units of Yugoslavia or
the Soviet Union, the Indian reservations that exist in many countries

in North and South America, and the "homelands" in South Africa.
Both forms of the partition option attempt to avoid or reduce
conflict by putting a border between the conflicting groups. Sometimes it is easier for both individuals and groups to get along if they
don't have to live together. This isn't always totally successful, however,
since external partition may just turn domestic conflict or civil war
into international war. The history of relations between India and
Pakistan illustrates this.
C. Co-existence
As used here, "co-existence" simply means that two or more religious
or cultural groups are trying to live together within a single, non-par-

titioned political unit. This includes systems where the minority is
forced into an inferior and subordinate position as an alternative to

elimination or partition. Co-existence, like the other two broad
options, has more than one form.
Perhaps the most repressive form of co-existence, apart from
enslavement, is where the minority group is segregated, subordinated
and silenced. I'll call this Triple S Co-existence. Obviously, separation
and subordination admit of degrees. If the degree of separation is so
large as to involve formal territorial boundaries, then this is an example
of partition rather than co-existence.

it leaves Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in India, the major
problem of Hindu-Muslim relations within the sub-continent has become
manageable because of the partition. Without it, a stable government capable of
dealing reasonably with any problem could not have been formed for any part of the
country. - D. R Gadgil, Human Rights in a Multi-NationalSociety, Gokhale Institute
of Politics and Economics (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1968), p. 17.
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Under Triple S Co-existence, the majority effectively says to the
minority, "we won't kill you or exile you, and we won't partition you
externally or internally, but in order to be allowed to live here in peace
the members of your group are going to have to keep to yourselves
(except when you go to work), accept a socially and politically subordinate position, and keep quiet. You're going to have to lay low." This
approach is a way of having many of the advantages of partition
without having to go to the trouble of redrawing political boundaries
and without having to give the minority control over some territory.
The Triple S system is exemplified by the Jim Crow system of segre-

gating blacks in the U.S. and by the system of apartheid in South
Africa. Historically, Jews in Europe and the Arab countries often lived
under something like the Triple S system.
Separation sometimes occurs without subordination or silencing.
This kind of society has different groups that stay largely separate from
each other, but none of the groups forces any of the others into a subordinate position.8
Co-existence without separation or subordination is another possibility. It involves trying to live together without using formal or
informal boundaries to separate different groups and without using
social or political measures to assign greater status or power to some
groups at the expense of others. If successful, this kind of society might
be described as "tolerant". People in such a society generally accept
cultural and religious differences without penalizing them, without
insisting that they be confined to some separate area, and without
using cultural and religious boundaries to impose a hierarchy of status
or power.
The United States seems committed, at least at the level of national
policy, to moving towards this form of co-existence and tolerance.
Landmarks of the commitment to full religious tolerance can be seen
in constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, in protections against
discrimination based on religion, and in Supreme Court interpreta-

8 On unranked relations between ethnic groups, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 21-36.

James W Nickel

286

dions extending religious freedom.9 Landmarks of the commitment to
full racial tolerance can be seen in the Brown decision and subsequent
desegregation cases, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and in many state statutes protecting minority rights. 10

IL. TOLERANCE AND THE PLURALIST IDEAL
To connect tolerance with freedom of expression, we can ask why
"silenced" often goes together with separation and subordination.
Separation (or "segregation") may be sought as a symbol of superiority,
or because the majority group dislikes the minority's religion or
culture and wishes to avoid its influence. Subordination involves
imposing an inferior social, political and economic status on the

minority. Such subordination often confers advantages on members of
the majority in the social, political and economic spheres.
To understand the role of silencing a minority that is separated and

subordinated, consider that members of the minority who are able to
speak publicly and freely are likely to do two things the majority dislikes. First, members of a minority group may spread the religion or

culture whose influence the majority wishes to limit. Second, members
of a minority group may assert their group's equality or superiority and
protest or attempt to upset the system the majority has imposed.

Co-existence

that rejects separation

and subordination

and

embraces tolerance must create attitudes and institutions that allow
people to be both full-fledged citizens and full-fledged members of
distinctive religious and cultural groups. More specifically, people are
not viewed as traitors, assigned to a lower civic status, or penalized

economically because of their distinctive identities or desires to keep
these identities.
9

See Kenneth L. Karst, 'Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity',
North CarolinaLaw Review 64 (1986), particularly pp. 357-361 and the citations thereto.
10 Brown v. Board of Education (I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education
(II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). More generally, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First
Amendment (1965); and Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989).
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We can view the attempt to make ethnic and religious identity
compatible with full membership in the larger society as embodying a
norm, a regulative principle for' the kind of society the United States is
becoming. This norm prescribes respect both for people's common

bond as citizens of the United States and respect for their distinctive
identities as members of specific religious, ethnic, cultural or racial
groups. It calls for the creation of a social and political framework in
which these two aspects of a person's life do not conflict importantly
with each other, in which maintaining one's distinctive identity - if
one wants to - does not require one to lay low or flee. I will call this
norm thepluralistideal."
To have convenient labels, let's say that the first part of this ideal
involves full national membership and that the second part involves

keeping one's distinctive identity. Expressed in terms of these labels, the
pluralist ideal is that full national membership should be genuinely
compatible with keeping one's distinctive identity.

The two sides of this ideal are based on somewhat different considerations. Issues about "full membership" are matters of equality. An
advocate of the pluralistic ideal might argue, for example, that separating and subordinating members of a minority, where this imposes an
inferior set of legal and political rights, is insulting to these people's

dignity. It tells them that their commitment to the country doesn't
count because of who they are, or that they are inferior personally or
culturally and hence not worthy of full membership. The case for full
membership is familiar to Americans because it has been made so
many times by black civil rights activists and others concerned to

obtain full status for minorities. It is the "full membership" side of the
pluralist ideal that supports freedom from discrimination.
The case for permitting people to retain a distinctive identity if they
want to is a matter of respecting people's choices and deep commitments, and thus a matter of liberty. Commitments to one's religion or
to one's ethnic group often go so deep they provide an important part

" My formulation of the pluralist ideal is indebted to the work of Kenneth L. Karst,
cited in notes 9 and 10 above.
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of one's identity. A liberty principle prescribing respect for people's
fundamental choices and projects is likely to give considerable weight,
other things being equal, to choices that are so central to who one is

and what one is about.
Other defenses of the pluralist ideal could focus on the instrumental
value of having a diverse but nonsegregated society. For example, an

argument in terms of the instrumental attractions of a diverse society
might claim that such a society is likely to be interesting and dynamic,
or likely to be tolerant of other forms of human diversity and thus
allow greater personal and social freedom.
Giving institutional expression to the pluralist ideal is complicated.

On the side of "full national membership" this principle calls for institutions to create sufficient unity or community among diverse people
to give practical meaning to shared citizenship. This requirement will
have implications in areas such as education, language policy, political
participation, military service, and immigration and naturalization.
Also required are measures to ensure access for people with distinctive

identities to all of the rights and duties that attach to full citizenship.
On the side of "keeping one's distinctive identity" the pluralist ideal
calls for institutions to ensure that people will have protected space for
their distinctive identities. To gather with people like themselves they
will need freedom of association and protections of privacy. To pass on

their identities to their children they will need freedom to educate
their children in ways they choose (within limits). To avoid having to
lay low they will need opportunities to express their beliefs and culture

and to complain about and seek remedies for grievances.
Implementing the pluralist ideal is not just a matter of institutions.
It is also a matter of developing tolerant attitudes, of learning to accept
people as good neighbors and good citizens even though one has
fundamental disagreements with them about religion, values, culture,
politics, or morality. The process of developing these tolerant attitudes

may need to be accompanied by a process of mutual accommodation
in which features of each group's morality, culture, or religion that are

most irritating to other groups are moderated or abandoned. The
majority may need to learn to accept people who are different from
them and to grant such people full status. Minorities, on the other side,
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may have to give up values, practices and demands that are extremely
abhorrent to the majority.
III. THE PLURALIST IDEAL AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The pluralist ideal does more than suggest that distinctive religious and
cultural groups should enjoy the same degree of freedom of speech
that other groups do. This would be compatible with depriving all
people and all groups of freedom of speech. Both sides of the pluralist
ideal require speech and expression for their full realization. Crudely
put, one can't enjoy either full national membership or keeping one's
identity without doing a lot of talking. Freedom of expression falls
under both sides of this ideal. Let's look more closely at both sides of
this.
A. Speech Connectedwith Full Membership

Full membership requires being able to speak as freely as anyone else.
To participate in the social, political and economic life of a country
one needs to be able to speak about general political and cultural
matters without fear of being told to shut up because one is alien, not
really an American. Specific areas in which this applies include social
and political debate, petitioning government for relief of grievances,
using the legal system, participating in political campaigns, and
running for political office.
Concerns expressed may be either local or national. For example,
Pennsylvania Mennonites may wish to protest a highway that will
diminish the amount of land available for farming, or protest aid to the
Contras. Immigrants from India living in New Jersey may wish to

protest their harassment by white teenagers, or help elect a congressional representative that they find attractive. Blacks may need to bring
law suits to challenge some of the ways in which their position in the

United States continues to be segregated and subordinated.
These examples illustrate one side of not having to "lay low". When
minorities are forced to keep quiet and out of sight they cannot
vigorously pursue remedies for grievances or seek to elect their own
members to political office. They must rather seek out officials in a
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quiet and obsequious way, hat (or bribe) in hand, and plead for relief as
a matter of mercy or good will. Similarly, they cannot take to the
streets to express noisily their political views. They must rather express
their views in a low key manner that relies on personal communications and polite persuasion. The pluralist ideal is incompatible with
these restrictions.
B. Speech Connected with Keeping One's DistinctiveIdentity
Keeping and expressing one's distinctive identity also requires speech
in many areas. To use and preserve a distinctive language one may wish
to speak it at home and in public, hold language classes so that others
can learn it or improve their facility, and broadcast or publish in that
language. To practice one's distinctive religion one may wish to communicate through rituals, sermons, and music. To retain an ethnic
identity associated with another country one may wish to read foreign
newspapers, take positions on who should be elected in foreign elections, and publicly denounce countries considered to be enemies of
one's ancestral country as well as U.S. aid to them. The general free
speech issue raised here is one of tolerance - both by the assimilated
majority and by other groups - of cultural, religious and political

expressions of alien, foreign or different perspectives. This is the other
side of not having to "lay low". It may involve wearing distinctive
clothing, speaking foreign languages in public, flauting group membership and pride, and dissociating from other groups.
Common national institutions used by almost all groups - such as
schools, government agencies, the military - are likely to be the focus

of controversies about expressions of distinctive identities. Controversies about bilingual education illustrate this, as does the recent case of
Goldman v.Weinberger in which a Jewish psychologist in the Air Force
sued to obtain the right to wear a yarmulke with his uniform while on
duty. 2
To be tolerant of a distinctive ethnic or religious group it is not
required that one approve of or like its culture, morality, beliefs and

12

Goldman v. Weinberger 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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activities. Tolerance is easier when it is allied with affection, but it is
quite possible to be tolerant of people belonging to a distinctive group
even when one thinks, say, that their religious beliefs are superstitions,
their rituals vulgar, their language harsh on the ears, their morals
shameful, and their attitude towards other groups dangerous. Commitment to tolerance involves a serious decision that permitting
diverse ethnic and religious groups to enjoy equal status is the best
policy for dealing with ethnic and religious differences within a single
society. This is quite different from the foolish and sentimental view
that one must learn to like all cultures and religions.
IV. TOLERANCE, EXPRESSION, AND FREEDOM FROM
DISCRIMINATION

An obvious part of implementing a tolerant response to religious and
ethnic diversity is enacting and implementing a legal right against
ethnic or religious discrimination. A model for such a right is provided
in the United Nations InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)13 In this convention, "racial" dis-

crimination is defined broadly to include "any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life" (Part I, Article I).
Governments agreeing to this convention commit themselves not to

engage in racial discrimination, to avoid sponsoring, defending or
supporting racial discrimination, to nullify laws having the effect of
" The text of this convention is available in Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human
Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Similar clauses defining a right against discrimination are found in the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights (1948), article 2;
The European Convention on Human Rights (1952), article 14; the InternationalCovenant

on Civil and Political Rights (1966, entered into force 1976); and the International
Covenant on Social, Economic and CulturalRights (1966, entered into force 1976). For a

fuller discussion of international human rights, see James W. Nickel, Making Sense of
Human Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
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creating or perpetuating racial discrimination, and to prohibit dis-

crimination by private parties or organizations.
This account of the right against racial discrimination is too narrow

for our purposes since it does not include discrimination against
people on the basis of religion or belief. This omission is easily reme-

died. A more difficult problem is how to define the boundaries of the
"public" sphere in which discrimination is forbidden and the "private"
sphere in which people are free to associate with and give advantages
to members of their own group. For example, construction companies
owned by Mormons may hire only or mainly Mormons. Here the
desire to be with one's co-religionists in the workplace conflicts with
employment opportunities for non-Mormons. A practical compromise, widely adopted in American law, is to permit this in very
small businesses - which can be viewed almost as extensions of the
family - but to forbid it in large businesses. This may be the best we
can do at reconciling freedom from discrimination with freedom of
association in this area of conflict.
Article 5 of the discrimination convention is interesting for our purposes in that it contains a list of rights to be guaranteed and applied
without discrimination. Most internationally recognized human rights
are on this list - including "Political rights, in particular the right to

participate in elections", "The right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion", and "The right to freedom of opinion and expression".
The effect of saying that the right to discrimination applies to other
rights is to require that these other rights not be granted, applied,
administered or enforced in a way that is discriminatory. This makes
the right against discrimination into a "meta-right". Its requirements
are incorporated into all other general rights. Because of this, an account of the right against discrimination is far reaching in its implications; it has the potential to influence what we say about the possession
and scope of all other rights.
Discrimination in regard to expression is a matter of letting some
people speak (write, publish or broadcast) in certain circumstances and
forbidding other people to speak or protest in those same circumstances. This may be a matter of law, policy, or application. For example, if police officers are largely drawn from majority or dominant
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groups, they may permit members of their own groups to protest and
criticize the government but not allow members of minority groups to
do these things. During the Jim Crow era blacks were kept from voting
(and hence from serving in political office), subjected to official or
private harassment - or murder - if they tried to organize politically
or express publicly their political views, denied access to the legal
system as a means of seeking remedies for wrongs and grievance.1 4
Some ways of repressing expression by distinctive groups involve
backsliding to ways of dealing with diversity that were presented
earlier. These ways of dealing with diversity involved killing or exiling
distinctive groups, and partitioning them externally or internally. If
one threatens with death members of distinctive groups if they don't
keep quiet and lay low one returns on a small scale to the policy of
annihilating those who are excessively different. If one threatens to
throw members of distinctive ethnic or cultural groups out of the
country if they express themselves or protest one returns on a small
scale to the policy of external partition. If one allows members of distinctive groups to express themselves only in their own homes or
neighborhoods, one returns on a small scale to the policy of internal
partition.
V. CONCLUSION

One approach to justifying a norm or policy is to offer a description
and explanation of it that shows its attractions and the flaws of its
rivals. In this paper I have tried to show how full freedom of expression
for members of distinctive religious and cultural groups connects with
tolerance more generally and that freedom of expression is part of an
attractive ideal, namely allowing members of distinctive groups to

enjoy full national membership without sacrificing their distinctive
identities.

" See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career offim Crow 2nd rev. ed. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966). See also Karst, Belonging to America, pp. 62-72.

